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The Corrosion of 
Representative Democracy
ALDO REBELO
 “Politics is far more complicated than physics,”
(Albert Einstein’s response when asked why man 
was able to dominate the atom but not control it.)
  
THAT WHICH is called the “crisis of the Congress” would be more aptly called the crossroads of representative democracy. In these so-called “post modern” times, of a delirious “end of history” and a fascination in good 
and bad faith for “direct democracy,”  based maliciously on elitist forums that 
dispense with social representation sustained by the universal vote, we witness an 
unparalleled offensive against Politics.  Instead of social pacts, opened with the 
fi ne needle of negotiation and sewn with the course thread of public debate, new 
types of guilds are presented to coral the great issues and national decisions. From 
the start, however, as a premise of analysis on an important plane and not as an 
epitaph for the theme, it is essential to admit that our political system has carried 
various deformities for decades.  A good portion of our diffi culties, cultivated in 
the state apparatus, originate from anti-Republican practices, certainly nurtured 
since the days of colonization and the Empire. Unrepentant, they are hidden or 
exposed, attenuated or exaggerated according to the rhythm and temperature of 
the political struggle. The moralist zeal is product of a second need in this bazaar 
of interests. 
 In an article for the electronic journal of the Democrats Party (DEM), 
entitled “The Greatness of Politics,” I had the opportunity to show that certain 
criticisms that are presented as new are older than the problem:
 There are few studies among us of the relationship between politics 
and public opinion as presented by the media, but in the case of the United 
States, there is an excellent work by an infl uential journalist, James Fallows, 
published in Portuguese by Civilização Brasileira with the title Detonando 
a Notícia [Breaking the News] and the revealing subtitle: How the Media 
Undermine Democracy.  Fallows, then editor of the magazine U.S. News 
& World Report and now national correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, 
addresses the “sensation of cynical distrust that threatens American politics.” 
With a philosophical tone, he reviews the discussions and disturbances that 
were particularly intense in the 1920s, heated by journalist Walter Lippmann 
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in Public Opinion (1922), and expanded by John Dewey in Experience and 
Natureza (1938). His principal thesis is that representative democracy, which 
was already hampered at that time by the speed of occurrence and promotion of 
events, would be threatened if its citizens did not become engaged. Currently, 
this deformity grows to the degree in which the essential fi gure of the voter is 
substituted by other forums and tribunes that appropriate their prerogatives of 
interference in public life.
 Progressive sectors are accepting a diversionist debate, and are even getting 
trapped in it. In the background, a “crisis of Congress” is indicated, virtue is not 
opposed to vice, but the State to the market, in a political struggle locked either 
with polished ambivalence, or with corrosive virulence, but it is not important, in 
these times of molecular biology, that the wolf is a clone of the lamb, because it 
cannot  disguise the nature of political struggle. Market here means the heralded 
ideological movement of the “minimum State,” which is nothing more than a 
dehydrated State lacking national interest and popular representation, and steered 
to the expanded reproduction of globalization. What interests us is understanding 
that the State, even as an instrument of subalternation of classes, is partially and 
necessarily aimed at the public interest, complying with its fundamental tasks, 
such as the  reproduction of the labor force, by means of universal policies of 
social mobility, and thus is susceptible to the infl uence of the people in  the 
group of institutions permeated by the inheritance of the arduously fought social 
struggles, and of the hard won conquests obtained with the goal of a human 
plentitude to which all could aspire. 
 A diffuse but transformative force is found in this movement, although 
an unbalanced one, with advances and setbacks, yet it is continuous, and acts 
towards the common good, and focuses, even if limited by the correlation of 
forces, on the construction of a truly sovereign and independent country, which 
is prosperous and free of the abject inequality that  maintains large portions of 
the population in subhuman living conditions. The debate that the “crisis of 
the Congress” wants to impose is the agenda of the multilateral organizations, 
fi nanced and guided by the wealthy countries, that leads to the confi scation 
of social struggles, through the implantation of forms, that are not so new, for 
disqualifying the State apparatus, and in it popular power, formally expressed 
in the Legislature, a tool of the objective conditions that overcome both the 
idealization as well as the manipulations of Politics. 
If there is a “crisis in the Congress,” it is a crisis of autonomy and 
competence. The great reform to be made in the Legislature is to provide it with 
the true complete power that representative democracy establishes for it. This 
is the foundation stone of the reform of the Brazilian State. The Legislature is 
a power usurped by its counterparts. On one hand, as Limongi & Figueiredo 
(1999) demonstrate in Executivo e Legislativo na nova ordem constitucional 
[The Executive and the Legislature in the New Constitutional Order], “the 
Executive, in virtue of its legislative powers, commands the legislative process, 
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thus undermining the very strength of the Congress as an autonomous power.” 
On the other hand, there is increasing judicial activism that, even in the 
authorized case of the Electoral Courts, doted with normative power, violates the 
principal established in Article 2 of the Brazilian Constitution that determines 
the independence, although harmonic, of the branches of power of the Republic. 
The institutional jurisdiction of the Legislature  has also been invaded, and 
in troubling dimensions of sabotage, by the movement that seeks to capture 
the dignity of the institution, highlighted by the challenges that are in fact 
condemnable, but unleashing blows that in essence are aimed not at the men but 
at the institution.
 It is a tautology to note that the National Congress is not only the most 
scrutinized institution, but also the most criticized. It is the Pandora’s box from 
which Zeus with clay feet, ready to save Brazil with shortcuts that fi rst serve their 
interests, extracts all the evils of national society. What other power, institution, 
sector, company, non-governmental organization, or whatever you may have, 
submitted to such a detailed and severe analysis, would not offer similar results? 
What to say of the “crisis of the press”? Of the University? Unlike Lot’s wife, 
the Pharisees did not look back, because they knew that they would turn to salt. 
Clearly, an equivalence of ailments does not exempt the Legislature from blame 
and scrutiny.  But it should be fi rst noted, for the purpose of analysis: that it is a 
transparent institution where everything is subject to verifi cation and comparison; 
the debates, the negotiations and the decisions are public. Nevertheless, the 
Legislature has a very low power of dissuasion and no power for retaliation. It 
lacks the Executive’s power to nominate (and to make the budget), and it does 
not have the punitive power of the Judiciary. The fi rst has generous funds for 
publicity and an elevated capacity to help business. The second has the prerogative 
of imposing civil and criminal sanctions to those who challenge it, and even to 
establish pre-censorship on the media.
 This is the reason for the swiftness with which a synthesis of the 
composition of the Brazilian people is treated as if it was a foreign body in the 
nation. One has the impression that in the place of our real Congress, emanated 
from the people in all its aspects, certain critics want to enthrone a House of 
Lords. For these it is always opportune to cite an observation of the philosopher 
Álvaro Vieira Pinto. In the book Consciência e Realidade Nacional  [Conscience 
and National Reality], a superb essay from 1960, he challenged the recurring 
nonsense that the Legislature needs to be cleansed of the imbecility of the sans-
culottes and ennobled by the wisdom of the best, the good men, capable and 
pure who are nothing more than the organic intellectuals  of the  aristocracy. 
“Elections in democracy serve precisely to refute the aristocratic illusions, which 
consist in supposing that it is the best who do the best,” wrote Vieira Pinto 
(1960).  It is within this “aristocratic illusion” that are strengthened the proposals 
for “political reform” and the false solutions of the closed list and of the district 
vote (see below). These are elitist measures that  favor economic power and which 
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are presented to voters like a mirage that would guarantee election of the best and 
bring together representatives and the represented.
 Debate of this “political reform” is on the agenda of the entire apparatus 
of the Brazilian State.  Maliciously enthroned as the “mother of all reforms” 
– in a country in which, opportunely, not even the classic capitalist agrarian 
reform was realized – changes in the structure of political parties and elections 
is nurtured by proposals that deepen the democratic process,  such as public 
campaign fi nancing, but also includes ostensive traps, either new or revived, such 
as the optional vote, the barrier clause and the closed list.  Despite the hiatus in 
democracy, we have a better electoral system than the critics with their special 
interests allege, and one that is more fair than the alternatives woven without 
regard for the interests of the people. Precisely for this reason, it is important to 
analyze the algebraic formulas that circulate in the market of tricks.  
Optional Vote– this is a consolidated tradition that has taken on weight 
in a phenomenon underway that some call the “massifi cation of politics.” 
Sociologist Leôncio Martins Rodrigues, in an interview with Época magazine in 
February 2007, noted that a large share of the electorate, the “modernized poor,” 
“expanded at the same time in which the clientelistic controls of the oligarchic 
clans that dominated sectors of the State apparatus got weaker and transformed 
municipalities and States into true family fi efdoms that guarantee them access 
to the federal government and public funds.” The optional vote would cause a 
deep depoliticalization of these voters, who would be stimulated  to indifference 
by the torrent of discredit heaped upon politics. The “electoral market” would 
be restricted  to those who “know how to vote.” It is worth noting that this so-
called  “massifi cation of politics,” was already traced in the Vargas era. It is the 
exaltation of the popular government of President Lula and, in contrast,  makes it 
diffi cult for the parties of the right or the far left to strengthen themselves under 
the current rules.
Closed List – Justifi ed as a strengthening of the (large) parties, the closed 
list in reality fi rst 
Indicates an emphasis on internal bureaucracy. In parties in which the 
members are subject to a program, such as the Communist Party of Brazil (PC 
do B), there would be no change, but in  the large parties, the closed list would 
the casemate of the party bosses of the oligarchy. It is also important to unmask 
the chimera that the exclusive vote for a party would allow election of the best, 
the pure, the most capable: that is, of the etymologically sustained aristocracy 
supported by the “government of the best.” This is a bitter illusion. If the list 
does not include the big vote getters that shine in these parties – the radio, TV 
and circus stars, the athletes, the “sheriffs”, etc. – the aristocracy would not 
elect anyone. In this discussion of the vote for a list, it must also be considered 
that, taking the Lower House as an example, following the international 
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methodological standard, the Brazilian electoral system combines the distinction 
of the candidate with the general performance of the party. The voter votes for 
both. And the total number of  votes for the party determines how many deputies 
(the most voted individually) it elects. There is, therefore, visible strengthening 
of the guild. For this reason, one of the most frequent criticisms of the current 
system of the open list, that the voter chooses one candidate and elects another, is 
a hoax to the degree in which this effect is complete in the closed list. Therefore, 
it is equivocal, as the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) determined, to consider that 
the mandate belongs solely to the party. 
Barrier Clause – This is an authoritarian device destined to eliminate the 
minority representations in society. Article 13 of Law nº 9.096/95 determines 
that only that party that obtains “fi ve percent of the counted votes, not including 
blank  and null votes, distributed over, at least, one third of the states, with a 
minimum of two percent of the total of each one, will have a mandate.” As we 
know, this Article  13 was considered unconstitutional by the Federal Supreme 
Court (STF). Some want to increase the latter quota to 5%. The justifi cation is 
that Brazil “has too many parties.” There are 30 parties registered in the TSE. 
The United States has 74, including  two communist and two socialist parties. 
The parliamentary democracies of Europe also have dozens of parties. In Israel, a 
country with seven million inhabitants, nothing less than 36 parties contested the 
elections to the Knesset. In the elections of August 2009 in Afghanistan, where 
the freedom  to organize is proportional to the intervention of the United States 
and to the good manners of the Taliban, there is one party for every million 
votes: 17. And, as in the large Western democracies, Afghanistan also permits 
independent candidates, in which the candidate is his or her own party. The 
district vote that is in use in most countries polarizes elections, annuls the small 
and we only hear of the strongest parties. 
District vote – This is the triumph of economic  power and the 
parochialism of politics. The effective deformities that affect Congress include 
that of combating the excessive division in parliamentary fronts that defend 
specifi c interests, groups or  minorities, which, in some cases, support what or 
whom needs special protection, but, in many others, harms the interest of the 
majority or even of the  nation. Although the party benches are statewide, the 
vocation of the Parliament is national. It is worth remembering the warning of 
the English conservative Edmund Burke (1729-1797) in his Speech to the Electors 
of Bristol in 1774:
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile 
interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against 
other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one 
nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local 
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prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general 
reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen 
him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament.
 With restraints and patchwork of this type, we will make little advance 
in the effective improvement of the political system and in the democratization 
of the Brazilian State. We run the risk of indefi nitely prolonging the fabrication 
of cyclical crises managed by the interests which they expose or repel. Far from 
being sincere interventions, they express the fl eeting confrontation that the 
philosopher Karl Marx, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonapart, speaking 
of the French coup of 1852, saw as “antagonisms  that periodically seem to work 
themselves up to a climax only to lose their sharpness and fall away without being 
able to resolve themselves.”
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